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ABSTRACT
Propaganda, disinformation, manipulation, and polarization are the
modern illnesses of a society increasingly dependent on social me-
dia as a source of news. In this paper, we explore the disinformation
campaign, sponsored by Russia and allies, against the Syria Civil
Defense (a.k.a. the White Helmets). We unveil coordinated groups
using automatic retweets and content duplication to promote nar-
ratives and/or accounts. e results also reveal distinct promoting
strategies, ranging from the small groups sharing the exact same
text repeatedly, to complex “news website factories” where dozens
of accounts synchronously spread the same news from multiple
sites.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Television is only the main source of news for older Americans as
younger generations are shiing towards the web [17]. And social
media has been playing a major role shaping what news are seen
and when. Paradoxically, despite having access to more resources
and information than ever, people are becoming more vulnerable
to misinformation. Information overload, nite aention, social
pressure towards being updated (knowing the trends), and the
lower cost of sharing opinions are creating a fertile environment
for propaganda, disinformation, and manipulation campaigns [3–
7, 10, 16, 20, 22].
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Although propaganda, misinformation, and inuence campaigns
have always existed [8], we have been witnessing a considerable
increase in state-sponsored cyber warfare [14] — sometimes inter-
nally via censorship and propaganda (e.g., China [1]), sometimes
across borders by promoting polarization and disinformation (e.g.,
Russia in the 2016 US elections [4, 7]).
Despite steady progress by researchers, journalists, and social
media platforms in detecting and combating misinformation and
inauthentic accounts, malicious actors continue to operate. e
aacks keep evolving in an arms race, eectively deceiving the
public and amplifying misinformation [2, 9].
e Syria Civil Defence, commonly known as White Helmets
(WH), was formed in 2014 during the Syrian civil war. It is com-
posed of volunteers who help with search-and-rescue operations in
dangerous areas or in response to bombing. ey wear cameras on
their helmets recording their missions. e WH published video
compilations to denounce atrocities, violations of human rights,
chemical aacks, and targeting of civilians commanded by Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad and Russia. A massive disinformation
campaign was mounted in response to discredit the organization
through fabricated news claiming, for example, that the WH were
terrorists and were tracking organs [13].
e Guardian was one of the rst news sources to report how
the WH were being aacked by a disinformation campaign sup-
ported by Russia [18]. e report showed some of the mechanisms
used to ood social media with fabricated narratives that would
be replicated in several websites to create critical mass against
the WH. Starbird et al. [19] presented a case study related to the
White Helmets disinformation campaign. ey gained insights
from exploratory analysis of digital trace data. For instance, they
performed qualitative analysis of tweets sharing links to a network
of suspicious websites. ey described this campaign as being
mostly driven by activists rather than automation. Levinger [11]
claims this campaign gained credibility because it was well craed
around a master narrative of decline and re-birth of Russia.
In this paper, we explore two suspicious scenarios in which
accounts could be promoting narratives and/or accounts: (i) a sim-
ple approach based on fast retweets, and (ii) a more sophisticated
one based on similar text. Employing the coordination network
detection framework [12], we are able to nd suspicious groups
inuencing online White Helmets conversations according to both
scenarios. e text similarity coordination network reveals groups
with dierent operation strategies, varying from small groups shar-
ing the same content, to large groups wrapping the same claims in
multiple websites.
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2 DETECTING COORDINATION
Let us apply the approach described by Pacheco et al. [12] to identify
coordinated accounts in the context of White Helmets disinforma-
tion on Twier. In particular, we are interested in accounts that
employ some degree of automation and for which the coordina-
tion is not disclosed or transparent. Rather than evaluating the
maliciousness of such accounts, we wish to unveil aempts to
masquerade the actions of a single entity as those of many indepen-
dent users. Coordinated accounts are oen challenging to identify,
especially when considered in isolation. eir behavior appears
suspicious mostly because multiple accounts are behaving similarly.
We show how dierent ltering strategies applied to the data can
highlight dierent suspicious behaviors. ese must ultimately be
inspected by humans to decide on their potentially oensive nature.
2.1 Dataset
We use an anonymized dataset provided by the DARPA SocialSim
project1; they used GNIP to query English and Arabic terms related
to the White Helmets between April 2018 and March 2019. In total,
the dataset contains over a million tweets by approximately 42
thousand accounts. e Twier snippets from posts and proles
presented in the results where obtained by querying the Twier
web interface.
2.2 Rapid Retweet Network
A rst, simplest approach to detect coordination is to identify
groups of accounts who consistently retweet the same source.
We create a direct network by drawing a weighted link from the
retweeter (promoter) to the account who produces the original post
(promoted). While retweeting is the simplest available mechanism
to help spread information, Twier discourages the systematic
retweeting of posts from any given source.2 Since retweeting is
commonplace, and to avoid labeling chance relationships as suspi-
cious, we only keep edges if the retweet happens within ten seconds
aer the original post, and if the promoter retweets the promoted
at least twice. us, the edge weights correspond to the number of
rapid retweets. Finally, we disregard singletons and extract the con-
nected components of the network to identify coordinated groups
of promoter and promoted accounts.
e resulting network is shown in Fig. 1. Most connected com-
ponents are dyads and triads. A node’s size is proportional to its
out-strength, i.e., to the intensity of its promotional activity. e
promoted accounts (smaller nodes) are not engaging in retweeting
activity and are usually accounts with many followers. Among
them we nd several veried and popular media accounts from
dierent countries, such as RT Arabic, Reuters, and Channel 13 (from
Israel).
e most evident feature from this analysis is the presence of
accounts that systematically retweet popular news sites with great
immediacy. Although the relationship promoter-promoted is clearly
identied, it provides insucient evidence to suspect a relation
of control of the promoted over the promoter. Indeed, the reputa-
tion of the promoted accounts, and the presence of promoters that
retweet unrelated news sites indiscriminately — like in the green
1www.darpa.mil/program/computational-simulation-of-online-social-behavior
2help.twier.com/en/rules-and-policies/twier-automation
or purple clusters in Fig. 1 — leads to the hypothesis that these
are simply automated accounts that independently try to exploit
the popularity of the content produced by news sites for their own
sake, for example to accumulate followers and gain inuence.
2.3 Similar Tweet Network
When hunting for suspicious behavior, considering text similarity
among original tweets may be more revealing than simple retweet-
ing paerns. Replication can have dierent motivations, such as
plagiarism and brokerage. Unlike retweets, tweets with similar con-
tent are considered original by the platform, and the links between
original and copy are hard to detect.
We adopted a strategy based on text similarity. Aiming to identify
groups of accounts that deliberately post similar content, we ana-
lyzed the text from original tweets, replies, and quotes but ignored
retweets. We measured text similarity using the Ratcli/Obershelp
Paern Recognition algorithm [15]. We considered all pairs of
tweets with a similarity above a xed threshold. We nally built a
similar-tweet coordination network of accounts where an edge indi-
cates that the two connected accounts were responsible for at least
one pair of similar tweets produced within a short time interval.
e network has two parameters: the text similarity threshold and
the time window threshold. Next we determine both empirically.
To reduce the computational complexity implicit in measuring
the similarity between all tweets in our database, we rst considered
the longitudinal stream of tweets and measured text similarities
only between tweets separated by at the most nine other tweets
along the stream. We sorted all tweets chronologically and used
Python SequenceMatcher [15] to compare the text of consecutive
tweets at distance +1 (immediate neighbors), +2 (one tweet in be-
tween), and so on, up to +10 (the tenth following tweet). Fig. 2
shows that a considerable amount of similar content is created in
the rst ten seconds aer the original tweet post. erefore, we
use this time window threshold to limit the pairwise comparisons
between tweets in our collection.
Fig. 3 shows the distributions of the pairwise text similarity for
all pairs of tweets created less than ten seconds apart. As expected,
most content is dissimilar and the probability of nding tweets with
increasingly similar content decreases monotonically. A surprising
exception is that the probability increases for similarity greater
than 70%. erefore, we set the similarity threshold to 0.7. From
now on, for the sake of readability, when we refer to similar tweets
we mean tweet pairs that have both content above the similarity
threshold and creation times within the time window threshold.
e similar-tweet coordination network is shown in Fig. 4. Two
accounts (nodes) are connected if they have posted similar tweets.
e weight of a connection represents the number of similar tweets
posted by the two accounts. To reduce the number of false positives,
we apply additional lters. An account is kept in the suspicious
network only if its strength is at least two. at is, (i) it has a similar
tweet to at least two other accounts, e.g., three accounts posting
similar tweets; or (ii) it has at least two similar tweets to any one
account, e.g., a pair of accounts with multiple similar tweets.
To demonstrate the strategies and behaviors of suspicious ac-
counts, a few coordinated groups are highlighted in Fig. 4:
Unveiling Coordinated Groups Behind White Helmets Disinformation WWW ’20 Companion, April 20–24, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan
Figure 1: Directed retweet network connecting the retweeter account to the original author. enetwork is ltered to disregard
spurious edges: promoter nodes are only present if they have retweeted the promoted at least twice, and each retweet happened
less than ten seconds aer the original post. Size is proportional to the number of rapid retweets (out-strength). A few of the
accounts being promoted by retweets are highlighted.
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Figure 2: Distributions of time intervals between pairs of
tweets with text similarity greater than 0.7. Most tweets
replicating content are created a few seconds aer the orig-
inal. e distributions show similar patterns regardless of
the sequential distance used to select tweets for comparison.
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Figure 3: Distribution of text similarity. Pairs of tweets are
compared if they were posted less than ten seconds apart.
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Figure 4: Similar-tweet coordination network. Nodes are Twitter accounts colored by connected components. Two accounts
are connected if they tweet text with similarity above 0.7 within 10 seconds of each other. Edge weights represent numbers
of similar tweets. Node size is proportional to strength. Singletons and nodes with strength lower than two were ltered
out. Four strategies are displayed by highlighted components. (1) Multiple accounts sharing the same content. (2) Few hyper-
active accounts with similar tweets, likely to be automated according to Botometer [23]. (3) Factory of news websites, with
multiple accounts pretending to post news from distinct websites that actually present the same content. (4) Multiple groups
of accounts using automation services (see Fig. 6 for an example).
(1) Multiple accounts sharing the same content—these accounts
post several similar tweets, however, not all group accounts
are active at the same time, nor is the combination of active
accounts the same. erefore, the group is not a clique.
(2) Few accounts with similar tweets—a small group of accounts
always posting similar tweets. e automation rules and
the coordinated behavior of this type of group are more
trivial. us, current bot detection tools, such as Botome-
ter from Indiana University [23], are able to capture the
suspicious behaviors at the individual level.
(3) Factory of news websites—several accounts sharing a head-
line and a shortened URL by social media automation tools
(oen dlvr.it). In this case, the URLs redirect to several
distinct domains hosting allegedly distinct media outlets.
However, all these websites look exactly the same (content
and style), except for the URL and the name in the top
banner.
(4) Accounts using automation services—several accounts shar-
ing the same headline and the same URL. e URLs are
shortened through automation services, such as “If is
en at” (IFTTT3), suggesting the posts were also au-
tomated. e URLs redirect to well-known news websites
3“If is en at, also known as IFTTT, is a free web-based service to create chains
of simple conditional statements, called applets. An applet is triggered by changes
such as e New York Times, or to intermediate blogs link-
ing to the prestigious websites. Even though some groups
are sharing exactly the same content (headline + URL), our
method breaks them apart due to longer time intervals
between bursts of activity.
We also explored more restrictive lters, for instance, a minimum
edge weight of two. at is, two accounts are only connected if
they had at least two similar-tweet pairs. is scenario shrinks
the coordination network by 60% (Fig. 5). Some groups disappear
completely, other components are broken up. For example, the
largest (pink) component breaks up into multiple smaller groups.
Although this approach might eliminate some false positives, it
might miss more sophisticated groups in which accounts alternate
activation in distinct campaigns.
3 DISCUSSION
e methods used here are not designed to classify coordination
as benign/malicious, nor organic/automated. ey aim to capture
unexpected relationships. Moreover, they shed light on behaviors
that are only revealed as suspicious at the aggregate level. For
instance, an account sharing a headline promoting a website is
that occur within other web services such as Gmail, Facebook, Telegram, Instagram,
or Pinterest.” [21]
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Figure 5: Coordination network as described in Fig. 4, but
with a more restrictive minimum edge weight of 2.
ordinary, but a dozen “dierent” websites sharing the same headline
with the same content at the same time are not.
Although additional lters can reduce the chances of false posi-
tives, it is possible that the method still mislabels a few accounts.
erefore, careful inspection of the suspicious groups is strongly
recommended. For instance, a potential source of false positives
for the similar-tweet approach is the share buon present in most
news websites. When people use this feature to share news on their
social media without making any changes in the suggested text,
they will end up sharing exactly the same content as independent
original tweets. If a website is popular, there is a good chance that
some of its readers share the same article within a few seconds,
creating a suspicious group among them.
Fig. 6 illustrates an example of the problem described above
using one of the most recurrent headlines in our dataset (“Israel
aids evacuation of hundreds of ‘White Helmets’ and families”).
Searching for the text generated automatically by the share buon
of eNew York Times website results in eight tweets total, spanning
more than 16 hours: all were created on July 23, 2018 but no two
in the same minute. On the other hand, searching for the text
shared by a set of accounts using IFTTT, identied by our method,
yields three times as many tweets within a one-minute interval,
and one day earlier than the rst share via nytimes.com. Moreover,
even if these two sets of tweets happened at the same time, the
similarity score of the two texts is 0.65. us, given the similarity
threshold used in this study, these accounts would be aggregated
into separated groups.
Lastly, it is outside the scope of this paper to unveil the motiva-
tions of the actors behind these coordinated groups. Some might be
trying to push certain narratives pro- or anti-White Helmets due to
ideology, or because they have been paid. Others may want to ex-
ploit the visibility of the subject to get protable trac. Regardless
of their intentions, these groups are manipulating online discourse.
4 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we explored dierent aspects of inauthentic promotion
of content and/or accounts on Twier in the context of the White
Helmets disinformation campaign.
First, we used a simple retweet approach trying to detect au-
tomatic retweets. We were able to identify groups of promoter
and promoted accounts, even though their coordination cannot be
proven.
Second, we explored text similarity. Most quasi-identical tweets
are created in the rst 10 seconds aer the original content is posted.
is suggests these copies are more likely to be the result of au-
tomation than a natural adoption and transmission of information.
We identied dierent strategies used by the coordinated groups,
ranging from just a few accounts repeatedly sharing the exact same
content to dozens of accounts synchronously posting the same
content in allegedly distinct media outlets.
e framework used here is sensitive to parameters, especially
the similarity threshold. We showed that being more rigorous to
avoid false positives leads to fewer and smaller groups, as expected.
However, ne tuning of the threshold enables the detection of
complex components with non-trivial structure. More work is
needed to formulate formal statistical methods to dene suspicious
connections based on comparisons with appropriate null models
rather than strict lters.
We hope the approaches proposed here can be used by social
media platforms, researchers, and journalists to promote fair and
reliable debates online. Ultimately, the early detection of disin-
formation campaigns aims to reduce their damage to the general
public.
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